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I. INTRODUCTION
Pirates do not only exist in legends and on rides at Disneyland. Modern
pirates are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers and roam the seas in
high-speed maneuverable skiffs that are supported by "mother ships," enabling
them to launch attacks from a distance of up to 500 nautical miles.' According
to the October 2009 Report of the International Maritime Bureau Piracy
Reporting Center (IMB), worldwide actual and attempted pirate attacks in the
first nine months of 2009 exceeded the total number of attacks in each of the
prior four years.2 In the first nine months of 2009, pirates boarded vessels in 114

1

2

See, for example, Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of InternationalSecuriy: Terrorism, Piray, and
Challenges for the United States 5-6 (RAND 2008) (noting that the more violent pirate attacks are
committed by organized gangs who operate from a mother ship using sophisticated weaponry);
European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of the Western European Union, Report: The
Role of the European Union in Combating Pirag,
11-12, ESDA Doc No A/2037 (une 4, 2009)
(explaining that pirates off the Somali coast are equipped with automatic weapons and rocket
launchers and use mother ships to place skiffs in the water farther from shore); Roger Middleton,
Chatham House Briefing Paper:Pirag in Somaia: ThreateningGlobal Trade, Feeding Local Wars 4, AFP BP
08/02 (Oct 2008) (noting that Somali pirates now use mother ships to increase the range from
which they can launch attacks). In fact, on November 15, 2008, Somali pirates captured the Sirius
Star, a supertanker carrying more than two million barrels of oil destined for the US, some 450
nautical miles southwest of Kenya. It was this capture that alerted the world to pirates' ability to
extend their reach well beyond the coastlines by using mother ships from which faster, smaller
skiffs loaded with outboard motors can be launched. See Thean Potgieter, The Lock of Mariime
Security in the Horn ofAfica Region: Scope and Effect, 31 Strategic Rev S Afr 65, 73 (May 1, 2009).
International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, Pirag and Armed Robbey
Against Shps, Report For The Period 1 Januagy-30 September 2009 ("IMB October 2009 Report") 6-7
(Oct 2009).
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cases, hijacked them in thirty-four instances, took 661 crew members hostage,
kidnapped twelve, and killed six.3
Not only is piracy alive and well, but its negative effects are felt by the
international community as a whole. Although the highest number of pirate
attacks in 2009 occurred off the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia,
significant attacks were also reported by Nigeria, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India,
and Peru. 4 Victims of the attacks include flag states, ship owners, crew members,
and cargo from all over the globe.s Furthermore, about 80 percent of the world
economy's goods-including critical energy supplies like oil-flow through
shared sea lanes.' Thus, piracy disrupts international trade. The presence of
piracy also threatens to destabilize those states that depend on revenues from
international shipping, such as Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen,
Oman, and Kenya.7 Piracy even impedes the delivery of foreign aid and
contributes to instability in already impoverished and unstable nations: the UN
World Food Program had to suspend deliveries of food aid to Somalia in 2007
because of the dangers experienced in traveling through pirate-infested waters.'
Finally, because many of the ships that do flow through narrow sea lanes are
carrying oil or other vulnerable supplies, piracy also creates the risk of a major
international environmental disaster.9
3

IMB October 2009 Report at 27 (cited in note 2). For purposes of gathering its statistics, the IMB
reports acts of piracy and armed robbery which it defines as follows: "An act of boarding or
attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and
with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act." Id at 4.

4

See id at 8, 10-11, 27-28.

5

See Piracy Against U.S. Flagged Vessels: Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the House
Subcommittee on Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation
& Infrastructure, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 79 (2009) (statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno,
Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, Dept of Homeland Security,
US Coast Guard) ("Statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno") ("[A] single piratical attack
affects the interests of numerous countries, including the flag State of the vessel, various States of
nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal States, owners' States, and cargo
shipment and transshipment States.").

6

See Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for GlobalTrade: Maritime-relatedTerrorismin an Age of Weapons
of Mass Destruction 3 (ISEAS Pubs 2004) (noting that in 2002, world merchandise exports were
worth $6,270 billion and that approximately 80 percent of international trade by volume is carried
by sea). See also Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Pirag at 4 (cited in note 1)
(stating that some sixteen thousand ships per year and half of the world's oil supplies pass
through the Gulf of Aden, the busy shipping lane used to facilitate trade between Europe and
Asia).

7

See International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, FinalReport: Workshop commissioned
ly the Special Representative of the Secretay General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Abmedon OuldAbdallab ("Nairobi Report") 33 (Nov 10-12, 2009).

8

See Middleton, Pirag in Somalia at 9 (cited in note 1).

9

See Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of InternationalSecurity at 17 (cited in note 1).
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Yet, despite the presence of piracy and its effects on the security of ships,
crews, and cargo passing through international and territorial waters, individual
nations and the international community as a whole are doing little to ensure
that pirates who succeed in committing their violent attacks are arrested,
prosecuted, and punished.o Rather, it seems most nations are shunning their
judicial responsibility to prosecute the pirates who commit crimes in their
territory or against their ships and crews. The apparent reasons for this refusal to
accept these judicial burdens are many: for example, inadequate or non-existent
national laws criminalizing the acts committed," concerns about the safety and
impartiality of local judges, the difficulties of obtaining and preserving evidence,
and fears that if convicted, the pirates will be able to remain in the country
where they are prosecuted. 2 But if pirates are not arrested, prosecuted, and
ultimately punished, it is unlikely they will be deterred-particularly given the
high rewards available to them in the form of escalating ransom payments."

10

See, for example, Nairobi Report at 31 (cited in note 7); John Knott, United Kingdom: Somalia, The
Gulf OfAden, And Piray:An Overview, And Recent Developments (Mondaq 2009); Drew H. Pearson,
Can The Somali PiratesBe Stopped?, 42 Sea Classics 14, 20 (2009); Fernando Peinado Alcaraz, Chasing
pirates is all vey well-but who is going to lock them up?, El Pais (English), Aug 17, 2009, online at
http://web2.westlaw.com
/Find/default.wl?bhcp=1 &cite=2009+WLNR+1 5970667&rs=LAWS2.0&strRecreate=no&sv=S
plit&vr=1.0 (visited May 3, 2010); Mike Corder, Nations look to Kenya as venue for piray trials, Bay
News 9, Apr 17, 2009, online at http://www.baynews9.com/content/36/2009/4/17
/461573.html?title=Nations+look+to+Kenya (visited May, 2010). Consider Eric Ellen, Bringing
Pirag To Account, 102 Jane's Navy Intl 29 (Apr 1997).

11

See, for example, Statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno (cited in note 5) (stating that many
nations lack sufficient legal structures to prosecute piratical acts); Nairobi Report at 25 (cited in
note 7) (noting that even as to those states with national legislation to punish acts of piracy, the
laws do not permit the exercise of jurisdiction beyond territorial waters); Report: The Role of the
European Union in Combating Pirag at 13 (cited in note 1) (stating that few states have adapted
national laws to apply international treaty provisions regarding the repression of piracy, and
indeed, within the EU, only Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden can exercise
jurisdiction over acts of maritime piracy); Alcaraz, Chasing pirates is all vey well, El Pais (English)
(cited in note 10) (noting that Spain's Penal code, for example, does not cover maritime piracy);
'Hyacked" sh spotted in the Atlantic: Russian warshp is on its way to save the crew, The Times (UK), Aug
15, 2009, online at http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?fn= top&rs=WLW10.03&rp=
/find/default.wl&ifm=NotSet&vr=2.0&sv=Split&cite=2009+WLNR+15912145 (visited May 3,
2010) (noting that Portuguese law does not permit it to prosecute those accused of committing
acts of maritime piracy).
See, for example, Corder, Nations Look to Kenya (cited in note 10).

12
13

See, for example, Veronique de Rugy, Paying the pirate'sprice: do the economics ofpirag demand the
at
online
(uly
2009),
Magazine
Reason
sea?,
of
the
privaiaion
(visited Feb 25, 2010)
http://reason.com/archives/2009/06/15/paying-the-pirates-price
(estimating between $30 to $150 million paid in ransom to Somali pirates in 2008); Marketplace
for American Public Media, The price ofpiray on shipping, Apr 10, 2009, online at http://origin(visited May 3, 2010)
marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/04/10/pm-piracy/
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This Article is concerned with the present failure of the international
community to ensure that pirates are brought to justice and punished for
violently attacking the ships and crews of many nationalities that pass through
shared public sea lanes. Although nations have implemented a variety of
measures aimed at disrupting piratical attacks-for example, by forming naval
patrols that roam pirate-infested waters-such measures alone are not sufficient
4
to deter all or most acts of piracy. Instead, pirate attacks are on the rise.1
Criminal prosecutions of pirates, however, could do much to deter and prevent
future piratical attacks." Therefore, this Article argues that piracy is a serious
crime affecting the international community and investigates international legal
solutions ripe for consideration. This Article further suggests that the
International Criminal Court (ICC) is the best international forum to bring an
end to the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy offenses.
The reasons for including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC are
many. As a theoretical matter, piracy would fit well within the ICC's mandate,
which provides it with jurisdiction over serious crimes of concern to the
international community." Piracy is a serious crime, the quintessential crime of

(estimating that Somali pirates collected some $80 million in ransoms during 2008); Munich Re
Group, Piray-Tbe Threat at Sea Takes on a New Dimension 20 (2009), online at
2
http://www.munichre.com/publications/30 -06152_en.pdf (visited May 3, 2010) (estimating
ransom payments for 2008 totaled about $80 million, with another $40-50 million for negotiation
and delivery costs).
14

See IMB October 2009 Report at 7 (cited in note 2).

15

Deterrence and the prevention of future criminal activity are primary goals of criminal
prosecutions-including international criminal prosecutions. For example, the Preamble to the
Rome Statute creating the ICC emphasizes the potential deterrent effect of the court, noting that
it is being created "to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the covered crimes] and
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes." Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court ("Rome Statute"), July 17, 1998, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 ILM
999, Preamble, 1 5. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U
Colo L Rev 409, 410 (2000) ("The pursuit of justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills
fundamental human values, helps achieve peace and reconciliation, and contributes to the
prevention and deterrence of future conflicts."); Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko
Tadic, An Appraisalof the First International War Crimes Tribunal since Nuremberg, 60 Alb L Rev 861,
868 (1997) (quoting Richard Goldstone for the idea that international criminal tribunals will
provide an enforcement mechanism to punish those who commit atrocities, thereby aiding in
deterring future atrocities).

16

The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that the parties have agreed to create a permanent ICC
with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole. Rome Statute at Preamble, 1 4 (cited in note 15). In addition, Article 1 also emphasizes
that the court will have jurisdiction over the "most serious crimes of international concern."
Rome Statute, Art 1 (cited in note 15). At the present time, the crimes over which the ICC does
have jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The parties to the Rome
Statute also have declared that the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
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customary international law, and the original universal jurisdiction crime." The
reality is that modern piracy involves many of the same violent and cruel actssuch as murder, kidnapping, and hostage-taking-that are used to commit
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes over which the ICC currently
has jurisdiction. Moreover, like the other crimes included within the court's
jurisdiction, piracy is a crime that is well-suited to the complementarity regime
utilized by the ICC treaty, whereby the ICC only obtains jurisdiction over a
crime if the state which would otherwise have jurisdiction over it is unwilling or
unable to prosecute the crime." Nations are not prosecuting acts of piracy with
any regularity, either because they are unwilling or unable to do so." Just as the
ICC can fill the impunity gap for the crimes already within its jurisdiction, it can
also fill the impunity gap for piracy. Finally, as a practical matter, there is
infrastructure already in place that can be easily adapted to cover piracy: the ICC
exists, it may sit regionally if necessary, and piracy can be added to the ICC's
mandate by an optional protocol. 2 0
Part II of this Article traces the historical legal background of the crime of
piracy and the international legal framework that has emerged to govern the

17

provision is adopted defining that crime and setting out the conditions under which the court can
exercise jurisdiction over it. See id, Art 5.
See United States v Smith, 18 US (5 Wheat) 153, 161 (1820) ("The common law, too, recognizes and
punishes piracy as an offence, not just against its own municipal code, but as an offence against
the law of nations (which is part of the common law), as an offence against the universal law of
society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race."); Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §5 404, 423 (1987) (stating that piracy is one of the offenses
that the US and other states may define and adjudicate according to the universality principle);

Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern UniversalJurisdiction'sHollow Foundation, 45 Hary

18

Intl L J 183, 190 (2004) (noting that international law today continues to consider piracy as
universally cognizable and that it would be hard to find any authority suggesting that piracy was
not covered by universal jurisdiction); Edwin D. Dickinson, Is The Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38
Hary L Rev 334, 335-39 (1925) (suggesting pirates as enemies of all mankind were subject to
universal jurisdiction since the early seventeenth century).
The Rome Statute provides in the Preamble that the ICC "shall be complementary to national

19

criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute at Preamble, 10 (cited in note 15). Therefore, as explained
in detail under Article 17, a case is not admissible to the ICC unless the state which has
jurisdiction over it is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."
Id, Art 17, 1 1 (cited in note 15).
See sources cited in note 10.

20

Pursuant to Article 3 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is to sit in The Hague in the Netherlands;
however, "[t]he Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable." Id, Art 3 (cited in
note 15). According to the working papers prepared in connection with the implementation of the
Rome Statute, in determining whether to sit outside The Hague, the ICC should consider the
practicality of such an arrangement and whether it would be in the interests of justice to do so.
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court Working Group on the Basic
Principles of Governing a Headquarters Agreement to be Negotiated Between the Court and the
Host Country, UN Doc PCNICC/2001/WGHQA/L.1, princs 16-23 (2001).
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prosecution of pirates. It further describes certain features of the international
legal framework that operate to limit its effectiveness as a tool for combating
acts of modern piracy. Part III describes the modern piracy problem in more
detail and addresses some of the international community's responses to the
problem. Part III also examines the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy
and the failure of nations to prosecute acts of piracy with any regularity. In
addition, Part III briefly addresses Kenya's agreement to try pirates captured by
the naval forces of various countries and the flaws associated with relying on
Kenya as a solution to end impunity for piracy. Part IV provides background for
the argument that an international tribunal should handle piracy prosecutions by
describing the literature that discusses the merits of using international courtsas opposed to national courts-to adjudicate cases involving international crimes
like piracy. Finally, Part V explains why including piracy within the jurisdiction
of the ICC is the best international solution, desirable on both theoretical and
practical grounds.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COMBATING PIRACY
A. Universal Jurisdiction
Piracy, under customary international law, is the oldest crime to which
universal jurisdiction2 1 applies. 22 For centuries, nations have deemed pirates to
be hostis humanigeneris (enemies of all mankind), such that any nation may use its
own domestic laws to try to punish those committing piracy, regardless of the

21

22

In 2000, a group of scholars and jurists met at Princeton University to examine the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction. In the document resulting from that meeting, entitled "The Princeton
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction," universal jurisdiction was defined as "criminal jurisdiction
based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the
nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction." Stephen Macedo, ed, Princeton Principles on
Universaljurisdiction28 (2001).
See note 17. See also William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Law of England 71 (9th ed 1783)
(stating that piracy is a violation of the law of nations and that "every community" has a right to
punish pirates); Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Stratec Theory for
NavalAni-PiragOperations, 40 Vand J Transnatl L 1, 11 (2007) (suggesting that piracy is the oldest
offense to which universal jurisdiction applies); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiedon For
International Crimes: HistoricalPerspectives And Contemporary Practice, 42 Va J Intl L 81, 110-11 (2001)
("[U]niversal jurisdiction to prevent and suppress piracy has been widely recognized in customary
international law as the international crime par excellence to which universality applies."); Michael
P. Scharf, Appliation of Treaty-Based UniversalJurisdiction To Nationalsof Non-Party States, 35 New Eng
L Rev 363, 369 (2001) (stating that piracy has been widely accepted as a crime of universal
jurisdiction for 500 years).
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pirates' nationalities or where the piratical acts took place.23 It is the general
heinousness of piratical acts and the fact that they are directed against ships and
persons of many nationalities-disrupting international trade and commercethat warrants universal jurisdiction.24 Indeed, the US Supreme Court early on
recognized the pirate an enemy of mankind over which states could exercise
universal jurisdiction because the pirate "commits hostilities upon the subjects
and property of any and all nations, without regard to right or duty, or any
pretence of public authority."25
Customary international law provides no agreed-upon definition for what
acts constitute the international crime of piracy. 26 However, at present there are
two international treaties that, at least in part, govern piratical acts and provide
the jurisdictional bases for nations to prosecute such acts domestically. The first
such treaty is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 2 7-a treaty with some 160 states parties which specifically defines
piracy. 28 The second is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
23
24

25

26

27
28

See Edward Coke, 3 Institutes on the Laws of England 113 (1797); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal
Jurisdictionunder InternationalLaw, 66 Tex L Rev 785, 791 (1988).
See, for example, Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, FederalJurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Aen Tort Claims Act After Filartigav. Pena-Irala,22 Harv Intl L J 53, 60
(1981) (explaining that piracy was subject to universal jurisdiction because of its heinousness);
Randall, 66 U Tex L Rev at 793-94 (cited in note 23) (suggesting that the most accurate rationale
for providing universal jurisdiction over piracy relies on the wicked and heinous nature of piracy
offenses which involve violence and depredation and the fact that piracy is directed against ships
of all nations). See also Statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno (cited in note 5) ("Maritime
piracy is a universal crime under international law because it places the lives of seafarers in
jeopardy and affects the shared economic interests of all nations.").
See United States v Brig Malek Adhel, 43 US (2 How) 210, 232 (1844) (Story). Justice Story further
explained: "If [a pirate] willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any other
object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much a piratical aggression, in
the sense of the law of nations ... as if he did it solely and exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri
causa. The law looks to it as an act of hostility ... it treats it as the act of a pirate, and of one who
is emphatically hostis humani generis." Id. See also United States v Smith, 18 US (5 Wheat) 153, 161
(1820) (cited in note 17) (stating that piracy is an offense against the law of nations and universal
law, with the pirate being an enemy of the human race).
In fact, in connection with their efforts in the early twentieth century to contribute to the
attempts to codify the international law regarding piracy, the drafters of the Harvard Research
Draft noted the lack of universal agreement on what exactly constituted the crime of piracy.
HarvardResearch in InternationalLaw Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy ("HarvardResearch DrafT'),
26 Am J Intl L 739, 749, 769 (Supp 1932).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), Arts 100-08, 110, Dec 10,
1982, 1833 UNTS 397.
For a list of state ratifications, see UN, Chronological ists of ratificationsofaccessions and successions to the
online
at
as
at 08 January 2010,
related Agreements
and the
Convention
(visited
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological ists_ofratifications.htm
Apr 3, 2010). Notably, although the US is not a party to UNCLOS, it did ratify an earlier version
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Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) 29 -to which 156
nations are parties.30 Drafted in response to the Achille Lauro incident when
Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise liner, the SUA Convention covers
ship hijackings that are politically motivated. 3 The relevant terms of each of
these treaties, together with their flaws as tools in combating modern piracy, will
be discussed below.
B. UNCLOS and its Flaws as a Tool to Combat Modern
Piracy
Article 105 of UNCLOS codifies piracy's status as a crime subject to
universal jurisdiction, providing that any state may exercise its right to repress
piracy by seizing pirate ships and arresting pirates to bring them to justice.32
Furthermore, according to Article 100, states are required to cooperate in the
repression of piracy to the fullest possible extent.33 As to what acts constitute
piracy over which states have universal jurisdiction, UNCLOS provides the
following definition in Article 101:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;

29

of the treaty with identical provisions regarding piracy. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
Apr 20, 1958, 13 UST 2312, 450 UNTS 82.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
("SUA Convention") (Mar 10, 1988), 1678 UNTS 221 (1998).

30

See

International
Maritime Organization, Status of Conventions-Summat, online
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topicid=247 (visited May 3, 2010).

31

See, for example, Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piragand the
IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 Am J Intl L 269, 270-72 (1988); Report: The Role of the
European Union in CombatingPirag at 12 (cited in note 1).

32

UNCLOS, Art 105 (cited in note 27).

33

Id, Art 100. The full text of Article 100 provides, "All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State." According to drafters' commentary written in connection with the identical provision
contained in the earlier version of the Convention, "any State having an opportunity of taking
measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by
international law." See International Law Commission, Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea with
Commentaries, 1956 (II) Yearbook of the International law Commission Art 38, cmt 2, at 282.
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(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).34
In addition, under Article 103, a ship is a pirate ship "if it is intended by the
persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of
the acts referred to Article 101." 35
Thus, UNCLOS defines piracy as a criminal act, the vast majority of
nations are party to it, and it even contains a provision, which, at least in theory,
requires nations to prosecute piratical acts.3 ' Nevertheless, as a tool for
combating piracy, UNCLOS is lacking in several respects. First, even though the
Convention requires nations to cooperate in repressing piracy, there is no
mechanism to enforce this duty. Rather, nations must incorporate UNCLOS
provisions into domestic law before they can prosecute acts of piracy. Yet,
apparently few states have taken this essential step, thereby making it impossible
for them to cooperate in repressing piracy by using the provisions of
UNCLOS." Moreover, only one major case has been brought using the piracy
provisions of UNCLOS: a Belgian prosecution against Greenpeace.38
Second, UNCLOS's definition of piracy includes only those acts that occur
on the high seas or outside the territory of any state.3 ' However, most acts of
piracy today occur in territorial waters and ports, rather than in international
waters, meaning that UNCLOS does not provide a jurisdictional basis to
prosecute those acts.40 A nation's territorial waters generally extend twelve miles
from its coastline, and only that nation has jurisdiction to prosecute wrongful
acts occurring in its sovereign territory.41 In addition, island states like Indonesia
and the Philippines may claim within their territory all waters between the
outermost points of their outermost islands.42 Therefore, attacks occurring
within the straits, gulfs, and archipelagos where international ships must pass

34

UNCLOS, Art 101 (cited in note 27).

3s

Id, Art 103.

36

Id, Art 100.

37

See, for example, Report: The Role ofthe European Union in combatingpiray at 13 (cited in note 1).
Carlo Tiribelli, Time To Update The 1988 Rome Convention For The Suppression Of UnlawfulActs Against

38

The Safety OfMartime Namgation, 8 Or Rev Intl L 133, 136 (2006).
39

41

UNCLOS, Art 101 (cited in note 27).
In fact, the International Maritime Bureau has indicated that its reports show that most attacks
against ships occur within the sovereign territory of states. See IMB October 2009 Report at 4 (cited
in note 2).
UNCLOS, Arts 2-3 (cited in note 27).

42

Id, Arts 46-48, 52-53.
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and at ports where they must dock are not subject to UNCLOS. 43 Nevertheless,
some commentators estimate that up to 70 percent of recent attacks have
occurred in such territorial waters.44
Third, at least some language in UNCLOS suggests that for an act to be
deemed piracy, two ships must be involved. Article 101(a)(i) defines acts of
piracy to include those illegal acts committed by the crew or passengers of a ship
"against another ship."45 Although Article 101(a)(ii) does not include this same
wording to define an act of piracy, commentators differ on whether piracy under
the Convention includes internal seizures, violence by the crew, or actions by
passengers of one ship against that same ship or its passengers. 46 If two ships are
required, however, then potential pirates need only to pose as passengers or
crew and thereafter hold the ship ransom in order to avoid being defined as
pirates under UNCLOS.
Finally, under UNCLOS an act is not piracy unless that act is committed
for "private ends."47 Accordingly, politically motivated acts of terrorism
committed against ships and their crew members on the high seas may not be
included within the definition of piracy under UNCLOS. While commentators

43

Indeed, some commentators have even suggested that acts of piracy within the exclusive
economic zones of states-which per Article 57 can extend some 200 miles from the coastlinemay not be covered by UNCLOS. Although Article 58 of UNCLOS does preserve universal
jurisdiction over piracy in the exclusive economic zones, states seeking to apprehend pirates in
such areas would have to do so in a way that would not interfere with the rights of the state
claiming that exclusive economic zone. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New 'JamaicaDiszpline":
Problems With Piray, Maritime Terronsm And the 1982 Convention On The Law Of The Sea, 6 Conn J
Intl L 127, 146-47 (citing T.A. Clingan, jr, The Law OfPiragy, in Eric Ellen, ed, PiragAt Sea 16870 (1989)). See also UNCLOS, Art 58 (cited in note 27) ("In exercising their rights and
performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have
due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and
other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part."').

44

See, for example, Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of InternadonalSecuntiy at 7-8 (cited in note 1)
(noting that in 2007, about 20 percent of attacks occurred in waters around the Indonesian
archipelago, including the Malacca Straits, while some 50 percent of the attacks occurred in the
territorial seas around Nigeria, Somalia, the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea, Tanzania, Peru, Bangladesh,
and Malaysia); Robert C. Beckman, Combating Piray and Armed Robbery Against Shos in Southeast
Asia: The Way Fonward,33 Ocean Dev & Intl L 317, 328 (2002) (stating that none of the attacks in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore constituted piracy under UNCLOS because they took place
in territorial waters); IMB October 2009 Report at 11 (cited in note 2) (showing twelve locations
where ships were attacked at ports and anchorages three or more times in the first nine months of
2009).

45

UNCLOS, Art 101 (a)(i) (emphasis added) (cited in note 27).

46

See Menefee, 6 Conn J Intl L at 144 (cited in note 43).

47

UNCLOS, Art 101 (cited in note 27).
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differ on whether this is the case,48 the presence of the "private ends" language
may make prosecuting certain ship attacks difficult or impossible under
UNCLOS. Indeed, perpetrators may seize upon the language as providing an
opportunity to claim their acts were politically motivated, thus requiring the
prosecution and courts to address this additional evidentiary and legal issue.
C. The SUA Convention and Its Flaws as a Tool to Combat
Modern Piracy
The SUA Convention was enacted, at least in part, to ensure that politically
motivated attacks on ships could be prosecuted by the international community
as acts of piracy.49 Pursuant to Article 3, a prohibited offense is committed by
anyone who: (1) "seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat
thereof or any other form of intimidation;" 0 (2) "performs an act of violence
against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship;"s' or (3) attempts to do any of the above.5 2 In contrast to
UNCLOS, the SUA Convention applies to offenses committed even in
territorial or archipelagic waters or in port, as long as the ship is scheduled for
international navigation.5 3 In terms of jurisdiction, any signatory state may
prosecute violations of the SUA Convention provided that: (1) the offense was
against a ship flying its flag; (2) the offense occurred in its territory; (3) the
offense was committed by a national of the state; or (4) a national of the state
was a victim of the offense. 54

48

See, for example, Bahar, 40 Vand J Transnatl L at 27-37 (cited in note 22) (arguing that the
"private ends" language in UNCLOS does not preclude treating terrorism on the high seas as
piracy inasmuch as the "private ends" language was likely meant to exclude from covered those
unrecognized insurgents that were acting solely against a foreign government and ships acting
pursuant to public authority). Bahar cites to a number of commentators who he claims mistakenly
or without analysis conclude that the "private ends" language in UNCLOS prohibits prosecuting
terrorist acts on the high seas using UNCLOS. See, for example, Zou Keyuan, Implementing the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in EastAsia: Issues and Trends, 9 Sing J Intl & Comp L
37, 44 (2005); Tammy Sittnick, State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism In The Strait of Malacca:
PersuadingIndonesia and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait, 14 Pac Rim L & Poly J
743, 758 (2005); Erik Barrios, Castinga Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Pirag Prblem in Southeast
Asia, 28 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 149, 156 (2005).

49
50

See, for example, Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Piracy at 12 (cited in note 1);
Halberstam, 82 Am J Intl L at 270-72 (cited in note 31).
SUA Convention, Art 3(1)(a) (cited in note 29).

5

Id, Art 3(1)(b).

52

Id, Art 3(2)(a).

s3

Id, Art 4.

54

SUA Convention, Art 6 (cited in note 29).
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Nevertheless, although the SUA Convention does appear to broadly
prohibit offenses that are consistent with modern piracy, like UNCLOS, the
SUA Convention is flawed. First, notwithstanding that the Convention requires
the signatory state to either extradite or prosecute an offender found in its
territory," the SUA Convention has apparently only been used in one instance."
Thus, whatever the Convention's merits as a tool to combat piracy, nations do
not appear to be using it. One commentator has suggested there is some
confusion about the treaty's applicability, in that some believe it can only be used
to prosecute acts committed by terrorists."
Second, even though the SUA Convention, unlike UNCLOS, theoretically
covers attacks while ships are docked or in territorial waters, the statute also
typically requires that the attack "is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the
ship."" Based on this language, using the SUA Convention to prosecute
attacks-even violent attacks-while a ship is docked may be difficult.
Finally, although the SUA Convention does apply broadly to offenses on
ships regardless of location as long as they are engaged in international
navigation, offenses can still go unpunished because only signatory states with a
nexus to the offense are entitled to prosecute." For example, SUA signatory
states may prosecute if the offense is committed against or on board a ship
flying a flag of that state, the offense occurs within the state's territory or is
committed by one of its nationals, or where a state's national is seized,
threatened, injured, or killed in connection with the offense. 0 This is in contrast
to UNCLOS, which at least permits-and possibly requires-all signatory
nations to prosecute, whether or not they have a nexus to the offense.
Therefore, if a signatory state with the required nexus to the offense does not
prosecute, or if the states with a nexus to the offense are not signatories to the
SUA Convention, pirates and maritime terrorists will go unpunished.6 2 Under
5

See id, Arts 7, 10.

56

See Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the Sea": The Difficulies of Prosecuting Pirates and
Terrouists 18, online at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1371122## (visited
May 3, 2010) (stating that the SUA Convention has only been used once-in a case the US
originally brought in the US District Court for the District of Hawaii against a cook who
commandeered a fishing trawler). For a record of the facts of that case, consider United States v
Shi, 525 F3d 709 (9th Cir 2008).

57

See Beckman, 33 Ocean Dev & Intl L at 330 (cited in note 44).

58

See SUA Convention, Art 3 (cited in note 29).

s9

See id, Art 6.

60

Id.

61

See UNCLOS, Art 100 (cited in note 27).
See George D. Gabel, Jr, Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guideines As An InternationalSolution To
Modern-Day Piracy, 81 Tul L Rev 1433, 1445 (2007) (citing Tina Garmon, Comment, InternationalLaw

62

Summer 2010

209

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

the SUA Convention, other nations would not have the jurisdictional basis to
prosecute.
III. MODERN PIRACY AND RESPONSES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
A. The Nature of Modern Piracy
Over the last decade, pirate attacks on ships and crews have become an
increasingly common occurrence.64 The IMB reports that the 306 pirate attacks
in the first nine months of 2009 already exceeded the total number of attacks in
2008." Furthermore, it is important to note that the IMB tracks only those
incidents that are reported. The true number of actual and attempted pirate
attacks could be much higher, as it is generally believed that many ship owners
do not report attacks for fear their ships will be delayed during an investigation
or that their insurance premiums may rise as a result.66 Moreover, the 1MB
reports that Somali pirates, in particular, are extending their territorial reach and
now threaten the southern part of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandab Straits, and
the east coast of Oman, as well as the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of
Somalia.6

Most commentators suggest that money and opportunity explain this
increase in piratical attacks. Modern pirates are primarily motivated by the
wealth they can obtain by holding the cargo and crew of merchant ships for

of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piray and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 Tul Mar L J 257,
273 (2002)).
63

Id.

64

Between January 2005 and September 2009, the IMB reports some 1,377 pirate attacks
worldwide. IMB October 2009 Report at 6-7 (cited in note 2). This amounts to almost one attack
every day some place in the world.
Id (cited in note 2). In the waters off the coast of Somalia, forty-seven pirate attacks were
reported in the first nine months of 2009 as compared to twelve for the same period of the prior
year. In the Gulf of Aden, 100 attacks were reported in the first nine months of 2009, as
compared to fifty-one for the previous year. See ICC Commercial Crime Services, Unprecedented
at
http://www.icconline
21,
2009),
(Oct
increase in Somali pirate activity
ccs.org/index.php?option=com-content& view=Article& id=376 (May 3, 2010).
See IMB October 2009 Report at 27 (cited in note 2) (noting that a Denmark-based Risk Intelligence
organization estimates that some 50 percent of pirate attacks on vessels related to the oil industry
go unreported). See also, Chalk, The Mariime Dimension of InternationalSecurity at 7 (cited in note 1);
John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern PiragAnd Terror On The High Seas 181 (Penguin Books
2003).
IMB October 2009 Report at 27 (cited in note 2).

65
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ransom. 6 Some authorities estimate that ransom payments made to pirates for.
the safe return of crew totaled more than $80 million for the year 2008.
Estimates further put the average ransom at about $2 million, with "mere
gunmen" in Somalia earning up to $20,000 for participating in an attack-this in
a country where the average income is $500 per year and many are at risk of
starvation.70 These lucrative potential payoffs have also had the effect of
increasing the stakes of piracy, which also likely explains the increasingly violent
nature of the attacks. For example, the use of guns more than doubled in the
first nine months of 2009 compared to the first nine months of 2008."
In terms of opportunity, the huge amount of commercial maritime traffic
provides pirates with plenty of targets. Seaborne trade increased some 300
percent from 1970 to 2006, from about 2.5 billion tons to about 7.5 billion tons
per year. 72 About 80 percent of all global freight is shipped by sea, and some
twelve to fifteen million containers are on the world's oceans at any given time.73
Much of that freight travels through narrow and congested maritime
chokepoints, such as the Malacca Straits, the Strait of Bab el-Mandab, the
Hormuz Straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal.74 Ships must
significantly reduce their speed to ensure safe passage through these narrow sea
lanes, making the large and slow-moving merchant vessels easy targets for
pirates who can quickly overtake them using small, fast, and maneuverable
skiffs.7 1 While the slow-moving merchant vessels are often large, they are also
often manned with small crews who are unable to sufficiently guard the ship
68

See, for example, Report: The Role of the European Union in combating piray at 4 (cited in note 1)
(suggesting that pirate attacks in waters off the Somali coast have become a regular source of
income for inhabitants of Somalia because the ransoms paid are huge and the risks to the pirates
are minimal); Potgieter, 31 Strategic Rev S Afr at 70 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that pirates are
after money, cargo, and ransom from ship owners, either for themselves or to finance militias on
shore).

69

See note 13. Regarding individual ransom payments, the Ukrainian ship Faina,which was carrying
thirty-three T-72 tanks, air defense systems, and rocket launchers, was held for five months until
the pirates were paid a ransom of $3.2 million dollars. The Saudi ship, Sirius Star, carrying two
million barrels of oil, was released after about two months when pirates received a $3 million
ransom. See Report: The Role ofthe European Union in Combating Piragat 4 (cited in note 1).

70

See Scott Baldauf, Pirates,Inc.: Inside the Booming Somali Business, Christian Science Monitor 6, May
31, 2009. See also Nairobi Report at 17 (cited in note 7) (stating that an armed pirate can earn
between $6,000 and $10,000 for a single hijacking yielding a ransom of about $1 million).

71

See IMB October 2009 Report at 27 (cited in note 2).

72

See Matthew Gianni, Real and PresentDanger FlagState Failureand Maritime Security and Safety 3 (June
2008), online at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/flag-state-performance.pdf (visited May 3,
2010).

73

Chalk, The Maritime Dimension ofInternationalSecurity at 10 (cited in note 1).

74

Id at 11.

75

See id. See also Report: The Role ofthe European Union in Combating Piragat 5-6 (cited in note 1).
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from attack." In fact, in many cases, pirates are able to board the ship and take
hostages within fifteen to thirty minutes of being sighted." Nor can
crewmembers typically defend themselves against those pirates since in most
cases, ships do not carry weapons. They do not carry weapons because such
weapons would ordinarily be impounded ashore by customs officers until the
ship sails out of territorial waters.

Money and opportunity may also explain why much of modern piracy is
now purportedly being carried out by well-organized pirate gangs-some of
which are funded by investors who can share in the profitable rewards of this
violent and disruptive activity.79 Some pirates have done so well that they are
now wealthy enough to hire others to mount the attacks: they invest in the
weapons, boats, and communications equipment, but they do not perform any
attacks, thereby permitting them to profit with little risk of arrest or
prosecution.so
B. Responses of the International Community
The international community appears to understand the severity of the
problem of modern piracy and also that it will not go away unless the
international community takes aggressive action to combat it. For example,
because of concerns about the consequences of acts of piracy on world trade

76

See Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of InternationalSecuity at 11 (cited in note 1).

77

See Lauren Ploch, et al, Pirag off the Horn of Africa 10, Congressional Research Service Report No
R40528 (Sept 28, 2009), online at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40528_20090928.pdf (visited
May 3, 2010).
See, for example, Burnett, Dangerous Waters at 88 (cited in note 66); Report: The Role of the European

78

Union in Combating Piragat 15 (cited in note 1).
79

See, for example, Baldauf, Pirates, Inc. (cited in note 70) (reporting that modern pirates are backed
by a network of investors and corrupt officials who purchase speedboats, sophisticated weaponry
and machinery, such as GPS devices, and choose targets based on the Lloyd's of London list of
insured ships, and thereafter pay themselves by underground money transfers); James Kraska,
CoalitionStrategy and the Pirates of the Gulf ofAden and the Red Sea, 28 Comp Strategy 197, 199 (2009)
(stating that most of the ransom money collected by Somali pirates is siphoned off to organized
crime kingpins who live in Puntland, and more recently, have moved to luxury compounds in
Mombassa, Kenya); Potgieter, 31 Strategic Rev S Afr 65 at 70 (cited in note 1) (stating that
modern pirates are often organized along military lines, and that one of the most prominent
groups is the Somali Marines which boasts between seventy-five and one hundred members and
possess arms which include AK-47s, heavy machine guns, and rocket launchers); Report: The Role
of the European Union in Combating Pirag at 6 (cited in note 1) (noting that piracy today is more like
organized crime with many competing pirate gangs, and with profits shared according to fixed
rules whereby 30 percent goes to investors, 50 percent to the attackers, and 5 percent to families
of deceased or captured pirates).

8

See Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Pirag at 6 (cited in note 1).
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and humanitarian food aid deliveries," in November 2007, some countriesincluding France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada-began providing
naval escorts for World Food Program ships.8 2 More generally, beginning in late
2008, a multinational naval force (CTF-150) started conducting counter-piracy
operations around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.83
The multinational naval force, which operated under a rotating command by the
US, Germany, and Denmark, included naval vessels from some fifteen states.
In January 2009, CTF-150 was replaced by CTF-151, which is also a
multinational naval force that combines military force, intelligence sharing and
coordinated patrols with the specific goal of countering and suppressing acts of
piracy." The EU has also launched its own counter-piracy operation off the
coast of Somalia using frigates and naval patrol aircraft." Non-western nations
are also participating in these counter-piracy operations. Pakistan, Japan, and
Turkey are among the nations that have contributed to CTF-151. China,
Russia, and India have not formally joined a particular task force, but they have
coordinated their actions with other forces.8 8
The UN Security Council has backed these coordinated efforts to combat
piracy with a number of resolutions authorizing military action against Somali
pirates at sea and on Somali territory." In a resolution dated June 2, 2008, the
Security Council authorized coalition navies for an initial period of six months to
enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use "all necessary means to repress
acts of piracy and armed robbery." 0 By Resolution 1851, on December 16,
81

Ninety-five percent of all humanitarian aid provided by the World Food Programme is
transported by sea. See Secretary-General, Report of the Secretat-Generalpursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1846 (2008), 135, UN Doc S/2009/146 (Mar 16, 2009).

82

See, for example, Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Pirag at 8 (cited in note 1);
Middleton, Piragin Somalia at 7 (cited in note 1).

83

See Secretary-General, Report of the Secretag-Generalpursuantto Security Council resolution 1846 (2008),
30, UN Doc S/2009/146 (Mar 16, 2009).
See, for example, id; Nairobi Report at 36 (cited in note 7).

84
85

See Nairobi Report at 36 (cited in note 7) (describing CTF-150 as a force of some sixteen nations
that patrol from the straits of Hormuz to the south of the Indian Ocean for terrorist activity). See
also United States Navy, New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established (jan 8, 2009), online at
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story-id=41687 (visited Apr 5, 2010) (describing the
creation of CFT-151 to combat the piracy threat off the coast of Somalia).

86

See Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Piragat 9 (cited in note 1).

87

See id.

88

See id.

89

See Resolution 1816, UN Security Council (June 2, 2008); Resolution 1838, UN Security Council (Oct
7, 2008); Resolution 1844, UN Security Council (Nov 20, 2008); Resolution 1851, UN Security
Council (Dec 16, 2008).

90

See Resolution 1816, UN Security Council, 7 (June 2, 2008).
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2008, the Security Council authorized even broader military action to combat
piracy, allowing states to use land-based operations in Somalia to fight piracy."
By that resolution, for a period of one year, "[s]tates and regional organizations
cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's
coast" were permitted to take "all necessary measures 'appropriate in Somalia,'
to interdict those using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake such
acts." 92 That resolution received unanimous support from member nations, with
nations stressing the many negative consequences resulting from the acts of
piracy off of Somalia's coast." For example, the representative from Norway
emphasized the threat to his country from piracy, noting that about a thousand
Norwegian ships pass through the Bay of Aden each year.94 The representative
from Turkey pointed out that two Turkish commercial vessels had already been
attacked and were still being held hostage.93 Yemen's representative noted that
due to regional proximity, Yemen was suffering the ill effects of the surge in
piratical activity, including a proliferation of acts of piracy and human
trafficking, as well as an uninterrupted flow of refugees towards its territory.96
International cooperation aimed at repressing piracy is not only limited to
the acts described above. To strengthen the international coordination called for
by Security Council Resolution 1851, the US created an international Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group). 7 Participants in the
Contact Group formed four working groups to address counter-piracy efforts,
focusing on: (1) military coordination and information sharing, (2) judicial
aspects of piracy, (3) shipping self-awareness, and (4) improvement of
diplomatic and public information aspects of piracy.9" Some fifty nations are
now members of the Contact Group, together with international organizations
such as the African Union, the League of Arab States, INTERPOL, NATO, and

91

Resolution 1851, UN Security Council,

92

Id.

93

See Security Council Department of Public Information, Secuiy Coundl Authoides States to Use
Land-Based Operationsin Somaa,As Part of FightAgainst Piracy Off Coast, UnanimouslyAdopting 1851,
UN Doc SC/9541 (Dec 16, 2008) (reporting that the Security Council adopted Resolution 1851
unanimously, urging countries to participate actively in defeating piracy); Resolution 1851, UN
Security Council, 1 12 (encouraging member states to cooperate in combating piracy). Consider
UN SCOR 63rd Sess, 6046th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6046 (2008) (recording several countries'
experiences with piracy).
See id at 25 (statement of Morten Wedand, on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Norway).

94

16

(Dec 16, 2008).

96

See id at 26 (statement of Baki Ilkin of Turkey).
See id at 29-30 (statement of Abdullah M. Alsaidi of Yemen).

97

See Statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno at 4 (cited in note 5).

98

See id at 84.
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the EU." In addition, nations in the areas closest to important shipping lanes
have also been coordinating separately to address the problem of piracy. In
January 2009, seventeen states from the areas surrounding the Western Indian
Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea met in Djibouti, and at the
conclusion of the meeting adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the
repression of piracy (the "Djibouti Code").'0 0 The Djibouti Code covers, among
other things, the possibilities of shared patrol operations by ship and by air, as
well as the use of piracy information exchange centers in Kenya, Tanzania, and
Yemen. Nine states-Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives,
Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen-signed the code at the conclusion of
the meeting.
In short, the international community and individual nations are apparently
willing to expend time, resources, and money to combat piracy and the threat it
poses to the safety and security of ships and crews from around the globe, as
well as to international trade, humanitarian aid deliveries, the stability of nations,
and the environment. However, even though the international community seems
to be uniquely focused on the problem of modern piracy and ways to prevent or
combat it, pirate attacks have only become more common and more violent
after these protective measures began in 2007.101 Despite the presence of these
multinational naval forces, in the last week of 2009, Somali pirates seized a
British-flagged chemical tanker and a Greek bulk carrier.10 2 Furthermore, as
discussed in more detail below, the successful pirates-whose attacks occur
notwithstanding the coordinated efforts of the international community to
prevent them-face little threat of prosecution and punishment.

99

See, for example, Contact Group on Pirag Off Somalia Marks FirstAnniversay, US Fed News (Jan 28,
2010), online at www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/index.htm (visited May 3, 2010).

100 See, for example, International Maritime Organization, High-level meeting in Djibouti adopts a Code of

Conduct to repress acts of piray and armed robbey against ships (Jan 30, 2009), online at
http://www.imo.org/newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic-id=1773&docid=10933
(visited May 3,
2010); IMO Djibouti meeing agrees antryirag measures, Marine Log (Jan 30, 2009), online at
www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMIX/2009janOO302.html (visited May 3, 2010); Nine
countries sign deal to fight Somali piray, Al Arabiya (Jan 29, 2009), online at
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/29/65299.html (visited Apr 3, 2010). See also The
Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In
the Western Indian Ocean And The Gulf Of Aden ("Djibouti Code"), IMO Council Doc C
102/14, Annex (2009) (visited Apr 3, 2010).
101 See IMB October 2009 Report at 6-7, 27 (cited in note 2).
102 See Jay Bandahur, Pirag at Sea, NY Times A21 (Jan 4, 2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/01/04/opinion/04bahadur.html (visited May 3, 2010).
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C. The Culture of Impunity: The Reluctance to Prosecute
Pirates
Although some attacks may have been thwarted due to the cooperative
efforts of the international community to combat piracy, few of the pirates are
being prosecuted despite the existence of universal jurisdiction and the
international treaties discussed above.'0 3 Apparently, states have used universal
jurisdiction as a basis for prosecuting acts of piracy only in very few instanceseven though such jurisdiction has existed for hundreds of years.'0 4 States have
used UNCLOS and the SUA Convention provisions even more rarely as a basis
on which to prosecute acts of piracy.' 5 Furthermore, it is unlikely that many
states have even incorporated those treaty provisions into their national laws.o
Failing to incorporate treaty provisions aside, some states do not even have
national laws that criminalize piracy, and where states have such laws, they are
not uniform in how they operate or the conduct they prohibit. 07
Instead of bringing pirates to justice, a culture of impunity reigns, with
captured pirates being released and permitted to continue their illegal activities.
For example, in September 2008, a Danish warship captured ten Somali pirates,
but then later released them on a Somali beach, even though the pirates were
found with assault weapons and notes stating how they would split their piracy

103

Some nations have undertaken to prosecute piracy, but the prosecutions are few when compared
to the number of pirates (including those who finance and plan the attacks) who must have
participated in several hundred attacks that have occurred in each of the last several years. For
example, the Netherlands is prosecuting five Somali pirates who attacked a Dutch Antilles-flagged
ship for sea robbery. France is prosecuting several more piracy suspects. See Corder, Nations look
to Kenya (cited in note 10). The US is trying its first pirate in more than a century-a Somali who
allegedly participated in hijacking the Maersk Alabama and holding its American captain hostage
off the coast of Somalia ship during April 2009. See Ed Pilkington, Somali teen facesfirst USpirag
chares in over a century, guardian.co.uk (Apr 22, 2009), online at http://guardian.co.uk/world/
2009/apr/21/somali-pirate-trial-new-york (visited Apr 3, 2010). Furthermore, as discussed in
more detail below, the EU and the US have entered into agreements to have Kenya try pirates
they capture.

104

See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piray Analogy: Modern UniversalJurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45
Harv Intl L J 183, 192 (2004), citing Alfred Rubin, The Law ofPiray 302, 348 n 50 (2d ed 1998).

105

See notes 38 (noting that UNCLOS apparently has only been used once in a case against
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United States v Shi, 525 F3d 709 (9th Cir 2008)).
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proceeds with warlords on land."os Britain's Royal Navy has been accused of
releasing suspected pirates even though hostages were found on board their
vessels. 0 ' In September 2009, the Seychelles released twenty-three suspected
Somali pirates.o Furthermore, Canadian naval forces have been disarming and
releasing pirates because the Canadian government has stated it lacks jurisdiction
under international law to prosecute them."' Rear Admiral Baumgartner of the
Coast Guard described the impunity problem for the US Congress:
Most of the pirates literally "get away" with their illegal conduct. Cases in
which pirates have been apprehended and actually brought to justice for
their crimes are the exception rather than the rule-the decision to try
Abdul Wali-i-Musill 2 notwithstanding. Most often, even in cases in which
pirate attacks have been thwarted or the pirates apprehended, the pirates
escape prosecution and eventually return to their criminal, but successful
business model: pirating vessels and demanding huge ransoms."13
It was this culture of impunity that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
mentioned in stating her support for Security Council Resolution 1851, which
authorized military action into Somalia in order to catch suspected pirates." 4
Yet, despite this recognition that pirates are not being brought to justice
and punished for their crimes, few nations are stepping up to prosecute
suspected pirates. According to one report, between August 2008 and
September 2009, some 343 suspected pirates were caught by naval forces and
See Paulo Prada and Alex Roth, On the Lawless Seas, It's Not Easy Putting Somali Pirates in the Dock,
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(visited Apr 3, 2010)
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disarmed and released, while only 212 were sent somewhere to be prosecuted."'
If nations are not willing and able to prosecute the pirates they capture, however,
then the culture of impunity cannot end. Pirates will understand that even if
captured in the act, they stand a good chance of being released and allowed to
continue with their disruptive and violent behavior. Notably, however, the lack
of sufficient laws alone cannot explain the reluctance of nations to help end
impunity for piracy because many nations have neither tried to use the laws that
exist nor adopted domestic legislation criminalizing the conduct that comprises
modern piracy.
For example, even with sufficient laws, the lack of domestic law
enforcement capabilities in certain interested states may make it virtually
impossible for them to prosecute many acts of piracy. Some territorial states or
states whose nationals are committing pirate attacks are either failed states or
otherwise lack the institutional capacity to bring pirates to justice, making it
unrealistic to expect that these states could alone manage the burden of
prosecutions."' In his Congressional testimony, Rear Admiral Baumgartner
made just this point when explaining the situation in Somalia. He noted that in
contrast to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore-which border the Malacca
Straits-the states surrounding the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa
generally lack the maritime capabilities to respond to acts of piracy in their
waters, and that Somalia in particular lacks judicial and law enforcement capacity
to address piracy."' Moreover, where the acts of piracy occur within territorial
waters-and most do"'-UNCLOS would give only the coastal state the
jurisdiction to try the pirates according to its domestic laws." 9 However, if
domestic laws or domestic law enforcement capabilities are lacking, then absent
the willingness of other nations to invoke universal jurisdiction or the provisions
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See Jon Ungoed-Thomas and Marie Woolf, Naty releases pirates caught red-handed: A legal loophole has
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6936318.ece (visited Apr 3, 2010).
See, for example, James Kraska and Brian Wilson, Combatingpiratesof the GulfofAden: The Djibouti
Code and the Somali Coast Guard, 52 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt 516, 518 (2009) (noting that captured
pirates cannot be turned over to local authorities in Somalia because the failed state generally has
no responsible authorities); Munich Re Group, Piray-Threatat Sea: A risk analysis at 29 (cited in
note 107) (suggesting that many nations with territorial jurisdiction over acts of piracy do not
have the security, enforcement, and financial resources to catch and prosecute pirates).
Statement of Rear Admiral William Baumgartner (cited in note 113). The lack of judicial capacity
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captured pirates on the beach. Commander Dan B. Termansen of Danish Fleet Headquarters
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of the SUA Convention, those pirates necessarily go unpunished. Even so, other
nations wishing to prosecute would likely have to rely on local authorities to
provide them with custody over the suspected pirates located within sovereign
territory-something that will be difficult if the state is a failed one or otherwise
lacking in institutional capacity.
Even for states with significant institutional capacity, prosecuting pirates
may prove difficult from both an evidentiary and a cost-benefit perspective,
particularly because the prosecuting state usually has to jail and possibly take
responsibility for the pirate if convicted. Ships may be attacked by nationals of
one state, registered under the flag of a different state, owned by nationals of
another state, insured by a company in yet another state, operated by a crew
comprised of nationals from a number of other states, and transporting cargo
from a number of other nations.120 As a result, most interested nations would
have to collect evidence from a location thousands of miles away from home,
the pirates and witnesses would have to be transported to the interested country
for trial, and the pirates would then likely have to be provided translation
services.' 21 Therefore, although many nations may be the direct victims of a
piracy incident and have a special interest in seeing the pirates brought to justice,
that interest may not be enough to compel them to take on the burden and costs
of such an international prosecution. Given that these difficulties discourage
even directly victimized nations from prosecuting pirates, one can understand
why nations with a less direct interest may not want to prosecute.
Beyond the difficulties and costs associated with prosecution, there is
evidence that nations-particularly Western nations-are avoiding their duty to
prosecute pirates because of fears that, if convicted, those pirates will then seek
political asylum for themselves and their families. Roger Middleton, a researcher
for Chatham House, the London-based think tank, explains, "These countries
120

See, for example, Kraska, 28 Comp Strategy at 207 (cited in note 79) (emphasizing the logistical
difficulties associated with prosecuting pirates because the cases involve suspects from one
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2008 and December 2008 in Somali waters. Intercargo, Piracy Briefing (Mar 15, 2010),
http://www.intercargo.org/piracy/68-piracy-briefing.html (visited Mar 17, 2010).
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Roger Middleton of the London-based think tank, Chatham House, as stating that one of the
reasons pirates are not prosecuted is because it is expensive to gather evidence and witnesses and
move them from the site of the crime); Statement of Rear Admiral William Baumgartner at 24
(cited in note 113) (" . . . [A]ll too frequently the navies that apprehended the pirates have faced
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in their courts."); Kraska and Wilson, 52 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt at 7 (cited in note 116)
(suggesting that the great expense and burden of transporting pirates explain why few western
countries are willing to prosecute).
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don't want to be bombarded by claims of asylum from the pirates, who would
ask not to be deported to Somalia, a country at war." 122 In fact, in April 2008,
the British Foreign Office warned the Royal Navy that detaining pirates at sea
could be a violation of their human rights and could also lead to asylum claims
by pirates seeking to relocate to Europe. 2 3 Moreover, fears about asylum claims
may not be completely unfounded. Reports indicate that at least two of the
pirates on trial for attacking a Dutch vessel have declared their intention to try to
stay on as residents.12
D. Kenya: The Current Solution For States Not Wishing To
Prosecute Captured Pirates
Although states have generally refused to prosecute captured pirates in
their own domestic courts with any regularity, they have not totally given up on
the idea of bringing pirates to justice. Many nations instead have recently turned
to Kenya and its courts as a venue for prosecuting pirates captured off the coast
of Africa. Beginning in late 2008 and throughout 2009, Kenya signed agreements
with the US, Britain, the EU, Denmark, Canada, and China whereby it will
detain and try suspected pirates in its courts in Mombasa.125 These agreements
provide for Kenya to receive financial support for the prosecution of pirates.
Although the present amount of support is estimated to be in the range of $2.4
million, Kenya has requested additional funds.126 As of October 2009, Kenya
was host to about 123 piracy suspects, ten of whom have been tried and

sentenced.127
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See Economist Intelligence Unit, Africa poliics: Combating Piragy, EIU ViewsWire (Feb 13, 2009),
at
online
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Nevertheless, while relying on Kenya is a convenient solution for nations
wishing to avoid the difficulties and costs associated with prosecuting pirates in
their own domestic courts, it offers only a partial solution to the impunity
problem for piracy. Kenya only has so much capacity and likely will not be able
or willing to shoulder the entire burden of bringing pirates to justice. Recent
statistics indicate that even without the addition of the suspected pirates, the
Kenyan judiciary system is significantly overburdened. Kenya has approximately
53,000 prisoners, yet its national capacity allows it to house about 16,000.128 Its
current backlog of cases is over 870,000.129 Furthermore, there are only three
prosecutors in the Mombasa office of the Department of Public Prosecutions,
and they have indicated they will be unable to take on the extra burden of piracy
prosecutions without additional help from prosecutors who would have to travel
from Nairobi-and countries other than Kenya would have to provide travel
expenses. 130 But even with a few additional prosecutors, Kenya still would not
have the capacity to handle a significantly greater number of piracy cases.
Kenyan prosecutors report that they are facing complex legal challenges that
require additional specialized assistance-such as paralegal case management
Indeed, Kenya's capacity to
support and assistance with legal research.'
expeditiously adjudicate piracy cases is hindered by what its own authorities
admit are outdated and formal rules of evidence which render inadmissible many
modern forms of evidence or make other forms of evidence admissible only
through onerous procedures.132
Beyond the problems relating to capacity, some have raised concerns that
Kenya is denying suspected pirates basic human rights as well as access to the
fair trial processes the international community expects defendants to receive.
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According to Lawyers of the World, a Paris-based legal aid network, Kenyan
prisons are overcrowded and at least some accused pirates were held for months
without adequate access to medical care or basic amenities, such as soap. 3 That
same organization also points out that under Kenyan domestic law, defendants
are not entitled to legal aid except in capital cases.134 Although some groups like
Lawyers of the World have agreed to represent suspected pirates in Kenya,
under Kenyan law the government does not provide them with defense
attorneys because convicted pirates in Kenya face a maximum of life in prison,
not death.'35
Indeed, one may question whether relying on Kenya to bring pirates to
justice is the best solution to the impunity problem given accusations that the
Kenyan government does not respect human rights. According to Amnesty
International's 2009 Report on Human Rights in Kenya, the government has
failed to investigate and prosecute the allegations of torture and unlawful killings
committed by Kenyan police during and after the disputed presidential and
parliamentary elections of December 2007.136 A Special Rapporteur for the UN
pointed to the "terrible" Kenyan criminal justice system, at least in part, to
explain why police could murder with impunity. He noted that the investigation,
prosecution, and judicial processes in Kenya are slow and corrupt."' In fact, the
ICC prosecutor has asked the court to open an investigation into Kenya's postelection violence, arguing that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes
against humanity were committed in connection with the December 2007
elections and thereafter." 8
In sum, it is unlikely that Kenya will have sufficient capacity or ability to
deliver the type of efficient and fair trial processes that would allow it to serve as
the solution to ending the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy. Only
recently, Kenya's Internal Security Mfinister complained that the piracy cases it
already has to deal with have overstretched the capacity of Kenya's security
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arbitragexecutions, Mission to Kenya, UN Doc A/HRC/11/2/Add.6 at 13-17, 23 (2009).
See InquiU into Kenya Violence Sought, Boston Globe (Nov 27, 2009), online at
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2009/11 /27/inquiryinto-kenyas_2007-p
ostelection violenceis-sought/ (visited May 3, 2010).

222

Vol. 11 No. 1

Bringing Pirates to justice

Dutton

agencies and courts.'39 As argued below, having an international court with
authority to adjudicate piracy cases should help address the many legal, practical,
and political obstacles that prevent nations from prosecuting acts of piracy and
bring an end to impunity for this serious international crime.
IV. THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
WITH AUTHORITY To ADJUDICATE PIRACY CASES
A. The National Versus International Debate
Historically, states have enforced violations of international criminal law
using two approaches: (1) domestication and adjudication of international law at
the national level and (2) adjudication of international law using supranational
courts or tribunals, such as the ICC. According to Professor Antonio Cassese,
however, many legal scholars argue that the best judicial forum for prosecution
of criminal offenses is national courts, rather than supranational courts.140 There
are two main reasons for this conclusion. First, national courts usually are
physically closest to the location where the criminal offense was committed.
Therefore, they should also be closest to the evidence necessary to prosecute the
offense: namely, the defendant, the victims, the witnesses, and the physical
evidence.141 In addition, the proximity to the offense means that the trial will
occur in the language of the defendant and his counsel, and allow the
defendant-if convicted-to serve his sentence in his own country, close to his
family.'4 2 National courts should also be closest to the community whose values
and rules were breached as a result of the crime. A local trial may be better able
to heal and provide justice to the community that has suffered from the crimes
committed.143 Second, proceeding through national courts is often considered
less expensive than adjudicating criminal offenses in supranational tribunals for
many of the same reasons cited above: proximity to the offense, the witnesses,
and the evidence."
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Nevertheless, there are problems with relying on national courts to
prosecute particularly serious offenses that concern or cause harm to the
international community more generally. First, national courts may not have
sufficient legal capacity or expertise to adjudicate serious crimes of international
concern.' 45 For example, some states may not have the proper legislative
provisions to cover the type of criminality at issue. 146 Even if they do, the
matters at issue may be too complicated for national courts-their police,
prosecutors, and judges-either because of the type of crime committed or
because, for example, the crime involves persons and evidence from more than
one state.147 Second, it may be difficult for national courts to administer justice in
an unbiased and fair manner.'4 8 Nations have a significant stake in the outcome
of any prosecution concerning their own nationals, and their courts may be
subject to influence. Also, even beyond concerns about influence, national
courts may not have the procedural rules in place to adequately protect the
accused. Furthermore, proceeding through national courts allow for uniformity
in the provisions for punishment of those committing international crimes.
These failings at the national level explain the international community's
increasing reliance on international courts as a forum to prosecute serious
international crimes. 149 International courts can be established with the legal
capacity (legislation, judges, and personnel) to adjudicate the crimes in
question.'s In addition, international courts should be able to provide justice
that is fairer and more impartial than justice in national courts, given that the
judges will not be linked to the state where the crime was committed or the
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defendants that committed the crime."' Finally, international courts can apply
international laws and rules, and thereby ensure not only that fair procedures are
followed, but also that there is uniformity in the application of laws and the
sentencing of offenders.' 52
As discussed below, an analysis of the aforementioned factors supports
international adjudication of piracy cases. Although there may be no reason to
abandon efforts to encourage national and regional prosecutions of piracy
offenses,' 53 a supranational enforcement mechanism can solve many of the
problems associated with such prosecutions, including those problems that are
currently leading to an impunity gap for piracy offenses.
B. Balancing The Above Factors Shows The Appeal Of An
International Criminal Court With Authority To Adjudicate
Piracy Cases
1. Physical proximity of the court to the piracy offense.
In the case of piracy, it is unlikely that even a national court would be
located close to the offense and the evidence necessary to prosecute it. Pirate
attacks usually involve perpetrators, victims, and witnesses of many nationalities.
Furthermore, the crime usually occurs in waters located thousands of miles from
the states that have been most directly harmed by the attack-for example,
those states with nationals who were victims of the attack either because they
owned the ship or some of its cargo, or because they were crewmembers.' 54 In
the one piracy case the US is prosecuting in New York, the attack occurred
against the US-flagged commercial ship, the MV Maersk Alabama, in waters
located near Somalia by Somali pirates, including the defendant, Abdul Wali-i-
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Musi."' Thus, the case is proceeding far from the defendant's home; evidence
and witnesses will have to be brought to New York; and if convicted, the
defendant will serve his sentence in the US. Furthermore, although Somalia is
located close to this offense and many other recent pirate attacks, piracy trials in
the courts of Somalia are not presently a viable means to bring pirates to justice.
Somalia is essentially a failed state in the midst of internal conflict that has been
ongoing for almost two decades."' Moreover, there are problems with relying on
Kenya to fill the impunity gap for piracy. Among other things, Kenya does not
appear to have the legal expertise and capacity to try large numbers of piracy
cases, and its ability to ensure fair trials and respect the human rights of
defendants has been criticized.'57
Piracy is unique in that it may be less important for a piracy trial to occur in
a national court than for other international crimes. Unlike other international
crimes-such as genocide, which is directed against one particular ethnicity or
community-piracy attacks are directed against many different nations and
victims. It is because the pirate attacks the persons and property of all nations
that in 1844 the United States Supreme Court recognized the pirate as an enemy
of all mankind over which states could exercise universal jurisdiction.' Thus,
piracy affects not just one nation, but rather the international community-not
only because the victims are from many nations, but also because piracy
threatens the safety and security of international trade, humanitarian aid
deliveries, the stability of nations, and the environment. Therefore, it is the kind
of crime over which an international criminal court could properly pass
judgment on behalf of the world community.
In sum, although an international criminal court with authority to
adjudicate piracy cases may not be located close to the offense, this is a
shortcoming also shared by most national courts that could prosecute piracy
offenses. In fact, one of the reasons why states almost always refuse to prosecute
suspected pirates in their national courts is precisely because the offenses
involve so many different nationalities and occur so far away."' An international
court could fill that impunity gap and properly pass judgment on the suspected
pirates whose victims include the entire world community.
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2. The financial costs of adjudicating piracy offenses.
Although prosecuting piracy offenses in an international court may be
costly, national prosecutions-and even the prosecutions in Kenya-are also
costly due to the international nature of piracy offenses. One of the main
reasons states are not prosecuting piracy offenses domestically even when their
nationals are directly affected by the attacks is because of the perceived financial
costs of prosecution.'6 0 After all, in most instances, the affected states would
have to transport the defendants long distances, jail them while they await trial,
pay for lawyers and translators, and pay to bring witnesses to the site of the trial.
Kenya is an excellent case in point. Victims and witnesses from around the
world still need to be transported there to appear at trial, and translators need to
be provided. In addition, organizations have stepped up to provide lawyers to
defendants who are not otherwise entitled to state-provided defense attorneys."'
According to some reports, Kenya has already received about $2.4 million in
funding to try piracy cases.' 62 Others estimate that Kenya and other countries in
the region have already received close to $7 million for piracy trials.'63
Nevertheless, Kenyan authorities have stated that they need millions in
additional funds to help them build the capacity to prosecute the approximately
one hundred pirates that they are currently hosting.'64 Yet, as of October 2009,
only ten of the suspected pirates brought to Kenya had been tried and
sentenced."' In any event, even if having Kenya try piracy cases is a relatively
cost-effective solution to the problem of impunity for piracy, cost savings may
come at the price of sacrificing defendants' human rights and rights to fair
judicial processes.
Finally, although supporting an international criminal court with authority
to adjudicate piracy cases would be costly, the costs are likely commensurate
with those necessarily required to try cases of attacks committed at sea involving
perpetrators, victims, and witnesses from around the world. In fact, a
comparison of the ICC's 2010 budget with the amounts already spent to support
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trials in Kenya provides some evidence that pirates could be brought to justice
by an international court at a cost that is not prohibitive. The ICC's budget for
2010 is approximately $140 million; however, though the amount may sound
large, it supports an administrative, prosecutorial, and judicial staff of more than
700."' Furthermore, with those funds, ICC prosecutors travel all over the world
to investigate difficult and significant cases involving genocides, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, and the court hires translators and provides funds for
witness travel. 67 If $140 million is a guide to what it costs to operate a court
with 700 people dedicated to handling investigations and prosecutions of a
variety of international crimes, it may be possible to fund a special piracy
chamber comprised of only twenty staff members for a small portion of that
budget. If one considers that twenty staff members is only 1/35 of the staff
currently used to operate the ICC on a budget of $140 million per year, even a
generous estimate suggests that it may be possible to operate a dedicated piracy
court on less than $10 million per annum. Given the amounts already spent on
trials in Kenya, and the additional amounts needed to provide Kenya with the
capacity to try those cases-especially as it only has three prosecutors in its
Mombasa office"'-spending $10 million (or even $20 million) on a dedicated
and specialized piracy team of experienced administrative, prosecutorial, and
judicial staff would not seem extraordinary.
3. Legal capacity and expertise of the court.
In the case of international crimes, supranational enforcement mechanisms
tend to have greater legal capacity, judicial resources, and expertise than would
many national courts-especially those located in the territory where the
international crimes occurred. For example, an international court may have
more precise legal definitions of piracy at its disposal, since any grant of
authority to an international criminal court to adjudicate piracy cases would
necessarily have to include definitions of piracy offenses falling under its
jurisdiction. In addition, administrative personnel, prosecutors, and judges could
be chosen based on their competence and expertise in international criminal law
generally, as well as their competence and expertise in handling the types of
offenses that constitute piracy more specifically.
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By contrast, many national courts that would have jurisdiction over piracy
cases are significantly lacking in legal capacity, judicial resources, and expertise.
Many states do not have laws that would permit them to prosecute piracy
offenses, either because they have not incorporated the provisions of
UNCLOS'" or the SUA Convention, or because they do not have domestic laws
that criminalize piracy.170 In addition, many nations-like Somalia-that are
located in piracy-prone territories would be unequipped to prosecute piracy
cases even if they had sufficient laws on their books. They simply do not have
the stability, institutions, or personnel to allow them to investigate and fairly
adjudicate such matters.'
Furthermore, even with the help of the international community, states in
the African region will have difficulty providing the legal capacity and expertise
to adjudicate piracy cases that an international court could offer. The Kenyan
experience is telling. Despite the significant sums already provided to Kenya by
Europe and the US to try piracy cases, Kenyan authorities indicate they do not
have the legal capacity or resources to expeditiously prosecute the approximately
one hundred pirates that are in their custody.17 2 Furthermore, although Tanzania,
another country in the region, has apparently indicated it would be willing to
have its courts handle piracy cases with funding assistance from the international
community, its laws would have to be amended for it to have jurisdiction over
piracy offenses occurring outside of Tanzanian waters."' Moreover, legislative
amendments may be necessary to ensure that evidentiary and procedural rules
promote efficient trials. 74 In short, these regional courts are lacking in legal
capacity and expertise-qualities that should necessarily be present in any
international criminal court with authority to adjudicate piracy cases.
4. Ability of the court to ensure the unbiased and fair administration
of justice.
The general consensus is that international courts are less subject to
political manipulation and bias, and should be able to administer justice more
fairly not only because of that lack of bias, but also because such courts can be
established with rules and procedures that ensure the defendant a fair trial. Even
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though piracy offenses may not be committed by governments or government
forces, some governments may benefit from it, either because they receive
bribes or payoffs or because they recognize that piracy is a viable way for people
in the community to earn a living that they may not otherwise be able to earn."'
Thus, some governments may have little incentive to initiate proceedings against
citizens who are committing the attacks. An international criminal court with
authority to adjudicate piracy cases would not face similar incentives to forgo
piracy prosecutions.
In addition, even if states are not making political decisions to forgo piracy
prosecutions, their laws and practices may be such that they cannot deliver the
kind of humanitarian treatment and fair trials the international community
expects all defendants will receive. As noted above, commentators have
criticized Kenya for failing to treat suspect pirates humanely and for denying
them the kind of rights associated with fair trial processes."' An international
criminal court can apply international principles, rules, and procedures that
would meet the humanitarian and fair trial standards required by the
international community. Furthermore, an international court would have the
benefit of ensuring greater uniformity in adjudicating piracy offenses. At present,
states have very diverse laws and sentencing possibilities as they relate to piracy
offenses.' While uniformity in trial and sentencing standards are not required,
certainly such uniformity can add to the overall fairness of the criminal processes
as they relate to piracy.
5. Conclusion.
In sum, piracy is an international problem, and an international criminal
court with authority to adjudicate piracy can bring pirates to justice and end the
culture of impunity that currently reigns. In many cases, states are unwilling to
shoulder the burden of prosecuting pirates because of the evidentiary difficulties
and costs associated with hosting piracy trials. In other cases, states are unable to
shoulder the burden of trying pirates because they do not have the legal capacity
and judicial expertise required to investigate and prosecute such offenses. In
both instances, an international criminal court could fill the impunity gap
175
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because the costs of prosecution could be shared by the international
community as a whole, and the court could be established with the legal capacity
and expertise to efficiently and fairly adjudicate piracy cases. Indeed, these
concerns have recently led many states and their representatives to call for a
special international court to deal with cases of sea piracy."'
V. PIRACY SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE ICC
A. The Proposal
To help close the impunity gap for piracy offenses, this Article proposes
including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The ICC came into existence
in 2002, when the required number of states ratified the Rome Statute, thereby
creating the court."' As of January 2010, 110 countries are states parties to the
ICC.1so The crimes over which the court presently has jurisdiction are genocide,
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See, for example, UN SCOR 63rd Sess, 6046th mtg at 28 (statement of Representative Jolle, from
Denmark) (cited in note 91) (suggesting that in the long term states might need to examine the
possibility of bringing pirates before an international tribunal for prosecution); Frank Gardner,
13,
2009),
online
at
Tackle
Piraq?, BBC
News
(Dec
How
Do
You
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7782016.stm (visited May 3, 2010) (reporting that senior
naval officers from the US, France, and other nations agreed on the need to establish an
international court to adjudicate piracy cases because there was presently nowhere to take arrested
pirates to stand trial); Germany Callsfor InternationalCourt to Prosecute Pirates,FoxNews.com (Dec 23,
2008), online at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,471804,00.html (visited May 3, 2010)
(reporting the German Defense Minister's call for an international court to prosecute pirates);
Netherlands proposes international anti-pirag tribunal, Expatica.com (May 30, 2009), online at
http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/local-news/Netherlands-proposes-international-anti-piracytribunal_53106.html (visited May 3, 2010) (reporting that the Netherlands' call for an international
tribunal to try pirates because of the failings in the current legal framework); Russia, Italy want to
cooperate informing intl court on sea piray, Russia & CIS Military Information Weekly (Oct 30, 2009),
online at http://web2.westlaw.com/Find/default.wl?bhcp=1&cite=2009+WLNR+22822513
+&rs=LAWS2.0&strRecreate=no&sv=Split&vr=1.0 (visited Apr 3, 2010) (reporting that Russia
and Italy agree on the urgent need to cooperate to form an international court to prosecute piracy
offenses); PACE president wants to discuss proposed European security treaty in Russia, Russia & CIS
Military Information Weekly (Dec 4, 2009), online at http://web2.westlaw.com/find/
default.wl?rs=WLW10.03&sv=Split&vr=2.0&fn=-top&cite=2009+WLNR+25508342+&ifm=
NotSet&rp=/fmd/default.wl (visited Apr 3, 2010) (reporting that the President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe wants to meet with the Russian leadership to
discuss the Russian initiative for an international anti-piracy court); Security Council Res No 1918,
UN Doc S/RES/1918 (2010) (expressing support for the establishment of specialized piracy
courts).

179

See Schabas, An Introduction to the InternationalCriminal Courtat 23 (cited in note 149).

180

See International Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute (July 21, 2009), online at
http://www.icc(visited
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome+Statute.htm
Apr 3, 2010).

Summer 2010

231

Chicagojournalof InternationalLaw

crimes against humanity, and war crimes."' According to the Preamble of the
Rome Statute, the ICC was created with the aim of ending impunity for the
perpetrators of "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole."' 82 In addition, because it is the duty of each state to
exercise jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes, the
jurisdiction of the ICC was created to be complementary to national criminal
jurisdiction: it will only investigate and prosecute where a national state with
jurisdiction over a case is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution." 83
One reason I propose adding piracy to the jurisdiction of the ICC is
because the ICC already exists. As a result, including piracy within the ICC's
jurisdiction would be less costly than establishing an entirely new international
tribunal to adjudicate piracy cases. The ICC has been in operation for more than
seven years, and it has operating procedures, facilities, and a large staff.
Furthermore, if states wish the ICC to adjudicate piracy cases in those regions
where piracy offenses most frequently occur, the court is permitted to sit
regionally. 8 4 Having the ICC sit regionally could potentially produce additional
cost-savings because at least some defendants or witnesses may not have to be
transported to the ICC's current headquarters in The Hague. If the court does
sit regionally, another benefit may result: the ICC may be able to share its
expertise and resources with local judges and lawyers, thereby building local
capacity to prosecute piracy cases.
Although piracy could be added to the crimes included within the court's
jurisdiction by amendment to the Rome Statute, proceeding by way of an
optional protocol would arguably be more efficient and expeditious.'
Amendments to the Rome Statute may only occur upon adoption by two-thirds
of the states parties, which must then be ratified by seven-eighths of the states
parties in order to take effect. Even so, states that have not accepted the
amendment have certain rights to withdraw as states parties to the Rome
Statute.' 86 By contrast, an optional protocol will come into effect for those states
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that sign it.' Any such protocol should create a separate chamber within the
ICC to handle piracy cases specifically.'18 Having a separate chamber could
ensure that piracy cases would be investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated by
those with the necessary expertise. Such a focus on expertise should also
produce benefits in terms of fairness, speed, and efficiency. In addition, having a
special chamber for piracy cases should make decisions about whether to have
such a chamber sit regionally easier because only personnel specifically assigned
to that chamber would be involved in and affected by the decision.
The theoretical and practical reasons for including piracy within the
jurisdiction of the ICC by optional protocol and for using a separate chamber to
adjudicate piracy cases are discussed below.
B. The Theoretical and Practical Reasons to Include Piracy
Within the ICC's Jurisdiction
1. Piracy is a
community.

serious

crime

of concern

to the

international

There are many theoretical and practical reasons to include piracy within
the jurisdiction of the ICC. Piracy, like the other crimes already covered by the
ICC treaty, is a serious crime of concern to the international community as a
whole. Piracy is the first crime over which states decided the exercise of
universal jurisdiction was appropriate, both because of the heinousness of
piratical attacks and also because piracy by its very nature harms the world
community as a whole.' Indeed, pirate attacks occur all over the world, 190 and
the victims of attacks are similarly diverse."' Furthermore, piracy disrupts
92
international trade, most of which passes through the world's shared sea lanes,'
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and even creates the risk of a major international environmental disaster.'
Piracy also disrupts foreign aid, contributing to instability in already
impoverished and unstable nations.' 94
In addition, even though a pirate attack cannot be compared to a genocide
that involves the mass murder of hundreds or thousands of people, its inclusion
within the ICC will not trivialize the court or its mission in ending impunity for
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Pirate
attacks are characterized by increasing cruelty and violence which will certainly
not cease until pirates are brought to justice.' 9s In fact, pirates are committing
some of the very acts that are included within the definition of acts that can
constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of an attack against
a civilian population: namely, murder, torture, and rape.196
Nor should it matter that with respect to the present crimes covered by the
Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor has stated that his investigatory focus is on
"those who bear most responsibility" or are the masterminds of the criminal
activity.' 7 Even if the masterminds behind the piracy remain hidden on shore,
bringing so-called "'low-level"' pirates to trial should still be a priority, since they
have committed serious crimes of international concern. Indeed, the so-called
"low-level" pirates are those who threaten innocent civilians and hold them
hostage at gunpoint in exchange for a portion of a ransom payment. In any
event, the prosecution of lower-level pirates is a promising avenue towards
obtaining the evidence necessary to prosecute the masterminds of the criminal
activity. Notably, ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have both prosecuted lower-level perpetrators for
precisely these reasons. Richard Goldstone, the former chief prosecutor for both
the International Criminal Tribunals for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, explained
that his prosecutorial strategy necessarily required indicting non-leader
perpetrators, especially because evidence against leaders was often more difficult
to obtain and because indicting those at the lower levels could provide the
building blocks necessary to indict those at the top.'
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2. Employing a complementarity regime like that used by the ICC
can help to end impunity for piracy offenses.
The complementarity regime used by the ICC is also well-suited to piracy
offenses. Under that regime, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where the nation
having jurisdiction over the offense is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution.""' Under the Rome Statute,
"unwillingness" includes instances where national proceedings are a sham or are
inconsistent with an intention to bring the person to justice, either because such
proceedings are unjustifiably delayed or are not being conducted independently
or impartially. The idea behind including the "unwillingness" provision was to
preclude the possibility of sham prosecutions aimed at shielding perpetrators
through government participation in, or complicity with, the offense.200 A
nation's "inability" to prosecute includes instances where, because of the
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the nation cannot obtain
the accused or the necessary evidence, or is otherwise unable to carry out the
proceedings.2 01 Thus, nations may, and are encouraged to, prosecute offenses
nationally, but the ICC's complementarity regime provides another forum in
which perpetrators can be brought to justice where national jurisdictions are
either unwilling or unable to fight impunity.
Even if it is not based on the criteria for admissibility presently employed, a
complementarity regime allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over piracy
cases can do much to end the culture of impunity that presently exists with
respect to piracy offenses. The ICC could accept jurisdiction over cases that
states are refusing to prosecute for a variety of reasons: some because they
prefer not to bear the costs and risks associated with prosecuting pirates and
others because they simply do not have the stability or judicial resources to do
so.202 Admittedly, a state's preference not to bear the costs of transporting
witnesses or a state's fears concerning asylum claims may not constitute
"unwillingness" in the same way currently envisioned by the ICC's
complementarity regime because the concern is not with potential government
involvement in the crime or other bias. However, "unwillingness" in the context
of piracy cases may simply be a form of "inability" because nations-even
wealthy nations-may not have sufficient resources to bear the burden of such
costly prosecutions, particularly given that in many cases, the nation is only one
199 See Rome Statute, Preamble $ 10 and Art 17(1)(a) (cited in note 15).

201
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of many victim nations. In any event, unwillingness should be judged by a
standard that recognizes the precise difficulties associated with having any single
nation shoulder the unique burden of adjudicating piracy cases.
In short, using the ICC's complementarity regime would allow states to
continue to prosecute piracy cases when they determine they have a sufficient
interest in the particular offense to justify the costs and difficulties associated
with prosecution-such as the decision of the US to prosecute the pirate
accused of hijacking the MV Maersk Alabama. In addition, employing such a
regime could also ensure that nations do not simply release suspected pirates and
allow them to return to their criminal activities. Those criminal activities pirates
return to not only threaten and harm innocent lives, but also interfere with
international trade, humanitarian aid, and the right of the world community to
generally enjoy shared sea resources.2 03
3. That piracy was not included in the original ICC treaty is no bar to
including it within the ICC's jurisdiction now.
The historical record indicates that the drafters of what later formed the
basis of the Rome Statute considered piracy-to the extent it is defined by
Article 3 of the SUA Convention-for inclusion within the ICC's jurisdiction
along with a host of other crimes which were termed "treaty-based" crimes.2 04
Specifically, the 1994 draft of the Rome Statute prepared by the International
Law Commission (ILC) at the request of the UN referenced crimes that were
established under about nine different treaty-based regimes and which
constituted exceptionally serious crimes of international concern. 205 In addition
to Article 3 of the SUA Convention,20 6 the 1994 ILC draft statute included
various treaties that were established to suppress crimes such as terrorism,
203
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See Part III.C.
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ILC Draft Statute at Commentary to Annex, Cmt 1 (cited in note 204).
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hijacking, hostage-taking, and narcotics trafficking. 207 The reference to narcotics
trafficking is of particular note, given that it was Trinidad and Tobago in 1989
which called for an international criminal court-after the idea had languished
for many years-with the express purpose of establishing a court that could
adjudicate illicit narcotics trafficking crimes of a transnational nature.208
However, some state delegations firmly believed that the ICC's jurisdiction
should be limited to the "core" crimes of aggression, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Thus, during reviews of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute,
treaty crimes were removed to bracketed form in the draft statute submitted for
review at the Rome Conference in 1998.209 In the end, the final Rome Statute
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confined the court's jurisdiction to the "core" crimes. 210 Nevertheless, since a
significant number of states continued to insist that the court's jurisdiction
should include terrorism and narcotics trafficking, Resolution E was adopted,
recommending that a future Review Conference "consider the crimes of
terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and
their inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court." 2 1 1
Therefore, even though the ICC's jurisdiction is currently limited to the "core"
crimes, at least some member states believe its jurisdiction should be expanded.
The historical record demonstrates that state delegations generally raised
several objections to the inclusion of treaty-based crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC. For example, some argued that limiting the number of crimes over
which the court had jurisdiction would simplify negotiations and likely ensure
more broad-based support for the court.21 Some states also suggested that
including treaty crimes would create issues regarding individual criminal
responsibility of nationals of states not parties to particular treaties and possibly
make it more difficult for states not parties to those treaties to join the court.2 13
They further expressed concern that including additional crimes could
overburden the court, especially because they believed many of the treaty-based
crimes could be better handled nationally. 2 14 Finally, with regard to terrorism in
particular, states suggested the crime could be difficult to define.215
None of these reasons for excluding treaty-based crimes from the ICC's
jurisdiction, however, should now serve as a basis for refusing to include piracy
crimes within the court's jurisdiction by optional protocol. First, the process of
negotiating the Rome Statute is over. Therefore, raising the possibility of
including piracy within the jurisdiction of the court will not impinge on
negotiations or detract from support for the court.216 In addition, because this
210 See Rome Statute, Art 5 (cited in note 15).
211 See Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/10 at Annex I, Resolution E (1998).
212 See, for example, 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report TT 54, 81 (cited in note 208); Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Summary of the
Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during the period 25 March-12 April 1996 ("1996
PrepComm Report"), UN Doc A/AC.249/1, 1 63.
213 See 1996 PrepComm Report 63 (cited in note 212).
214 See, for example, 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report
54, 81 (cited in note 208); 1996 PrepComm
Report 67 (cited in note 212).
215 See 1996 PrepComm Report 63 (cited in note 212).
216 It is noteworthy that although the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights stated in its position
paper its preference for limiting the jurisdiction of the ICC at least initially in order to facilitate
adoption of the Rome Statute, it nevertheless stated that its "acceptance of a narrower jurisdiction
for the court should not be taken as a reflection on the desirability of including treaty-based
crimes, if consensus on such treaties is reached." Moreover, the Committee emphasized that it
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proposal suggests proceeding by protocol, negotiations concerning piracy can
proceed separate and apart from any negotiations presently underway with
regard amending to the Rome Statute. Furthermore, proceeding by optional
protocol and by a separate chamber for piracy cases can help separate piracy
offenses from the crimes currently included within the Rome Statute. This
would address any fears that including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC
would somehow detract from the ICC's mission to end impunity for the most
atrocious crimes and punish those most responsible for them. In any event, as
argued above, piracy is a serious crime of concern to the international
community as a whole.
In addition, questions of which states had or had not ratified certain
treaties are now irrelevant. Piracy would be defined in connection with the
optional protocol to the Rome Statute. And, one might expect that states would
be very willing to ratify a protocol giving the ICC authority to prosecute piracy
offenses. States are already turning pirates over to Kenya for prosecution,
making it unlikely they would raise sovereignty concerns in connection with
relinquishing suspected pirates to an international tribunal. Also, as noted above,
many state representatives have already expressed support for an international
tribunal to try piracy cases. 2 17
Furthermore, although including piracy offenses within the jurisdiction of
the ICC will certainly impose some burden on the ICC, it is well-equipped with
significant resources and personnel at its disposal to handle that burden.2 18
Indeed, if one creates a separate chamber to adjudicate piracy offenses, adding
piracy to the jurisdiction of the ICC should not be overly burdensome or distract
the court from its other duties. Moreover, this is not a situation where national
courts have the resources and expertise to inexpensively and expeditiously try
piracy cases. 219 One of the reasons that some states are still pushing to include
terrorism and narcotics trafficking within the ICC's jurisdiction is because those
offenses cause a great amount of harm to some states which are without the
ability and resources to bring those criminals to justice. 220 Although larger
"strongly believes that the Statute should provide for a mechanism of periodic review that would
enable states parties to consider the addition of other crimes to the court's jurisdiction at a later
stage." Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Major
Unresolved Issues in the DraftStatute 18 (1996).
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See note 178.
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See 2010 ICC Proposed Budget (cited in note 166).
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See Part III.B.
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For example, in responding to arguments that the ICC's jurisdiction should be confined to several
"core" crimes, some states noted that the new court would not replace national courts, but would
provide an option for adjudication of cases like terrorism and narcotics trafficking, which require
large-scale intelligence gathering and other significant resources to prosecute-resources which
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countries like the US regularly prosecute narcotics trafficking crimes, even it has
brought only one piracy case in the last century. Including piracy within the
jurisdiction of the ICC could do much to close the impunity gap for piracy
offenses.
Finally, unlike the crime of terrorism-which some states object to
including within the ICC's jurisdiction because of the difficulty of defining the
crime so as to clearly distinguish between international terrorists and freedom
fighters 2 2 1-the crime of piracy can be defined. Nor should defining the crime
be overwhelmingly difficult. The texts of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention
already exist. There have also been some efforts by groups like the Comite
Maritime International (CMI) to draft a model piracy act to address the
perceived flaws in UNCLOS and the SUA Convention regarding their ability to
capture the variety of acts that constitute modern piracy within their purview.2 22
In addition, defining the crime of piracy anew can have additional benefits
beyond addressing flaws under the current international legal framework:
drafters could include provisions regarding evidentiary and other standards
necessary to make piracy prosecutions both efficient and fair, avoiding some of
the problems associated with trials in Kenya. In any event, definitional
difficulties should be no reason to allow pirates to escape justice. The other
crimes included within the ICC had to be defined in order to be included in the
Rome Statute, and states included aggression within the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to it being defined.223 Moreover, despite the difficulties of defining
terrorism, there are states that support including it within the ICC's jurisdiction
as evidenced by Resolution E.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a large and growing impunity gap for piracy that can only be
closed if the international community decides to act to bring pirates to justice.
Piracy is a serious crime of international concern that is only increasing in
frequency and severity despite the unique ways in which the international
community has been working together recently in an effort to repress and

55, 82 (cited in note 208)
some states do not have. See 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report,
(reporting some nations' push for expanding ICC jurisdiction to terrorism and drug crimes, in
paragraph 55, and giving some reasons for including such crimes under the ICC, in 82).
221

See note 215.

222

See International Maritime Organization, Legal Committee, Maritime ciminalacts-draftguidelinesfor

nationallegislation, submitted by the ComitiMaritime,93rd Sess (Aug 15, 2007).
223

See Rome Statute, Art 5(2) (cited in note 15) (providing that the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction
over aggression when a suitable definition is adopted).
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combat piracy.224 Although the international community may be thwarting some
pirate attacks, what it is not doing is sending pirates a message that piracy will
not be tolerated and that those who commit acts of piracy will be prosecuted
and punished. Instead of prosecuting the pirates captured by naval forces
patrolling pirate-infested waters, in many instances, nations are simply releasing
pirates-even those who are "caught in the act." 225 Some pirates fare even
better: they receive food and water before they are released to continue their
criminal activities.226 Thus, not only do pirates see that "crime pays" when they
receive a portion of the significant ransoms that are now being paid for the safe
release of ships and their crews, but they also see that "crime pays" even when
they are captured by naval patrols. Until the international community commits
to bring pirates to justice regularly, it is unlikely pirates will conclude otherwise
and change their behavior as a result.
This Article suggests that pirates should be brought to justice using the
already extant ICC by way of an optional protocol to include piracy within the
ICC's jurisdiction. Modern piracy is directed against victims from around the
world, creates harms that are felt by the entire international community, and
involves many of the same violent and cruel acts, such as murder, kidnapping,
and hostage-taking, that are used to commit the crimes already within the ICC's
jurisdiction.227 Also, like the other crimes included within the court's jurisdiction,
piracy is a crime well-suited to the complementarity regime designed to help end
impunity for serious crimes of concern to the international community. Nations
are not prosecuting piracy suspects with any regularity, either because they do
not have the laws, capacity, or resources to handle such prosecutions, or because
they do not want to bear by themselves the various burdens associated with an
expensive and difficult prosecution that affects numerous nations. 228 The ICC
could help end this culture of impunity regarding piracy offenses, and the
burden of supporting the court's adjudication of piracy cases could be shared by
the international community. It is true that acts of piracy will not entirely cease
just because countries show pirates that they are willing to prosecute. However,
closing the impunity gap is at least likely to deter some pirates who will learn that
they will be punished in return for their crimes, rather than rewarded.
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See notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text.
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See notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
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See Part III.C.
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